Language, memory, and sense perception in the religious and technological culture of antiquity and the Middle Ages by unknown
Oral Tradition, 10/2 (1995): 409-450 
 
 
 
 
Language, Memory, and Sense Perception 
in the Religious and Technological Culture 
of Antiquity and the Middle Ages 
 
Werner H. Kelber 
  
 
The Albert Lord and Milman Parry  
Lecture for 1993-1994 
 
 
. . . major developments, and very likely even all major developments, in 
culture and consciousness are related, often in unexpected intimacy, to the 
evolution of the word from primary orality to its present state.  But the 
relationships are varied and complex, with cause and effect often difficult 
to distinguish. 
(Ong 1977:9-10) 
 
 
 The two persons in whose honor this lecture is named were North 
American classicists of eminence who had acquired additional training in the 
oral traditional epics of the former Yugoslavia, an achievement unequaled 
among scholars of their time.  Long before interdisciplinary studies had 
come into scholarly and curricular vogue, Milman Parry and Albert Lord 
had attained a literacy in comparative studies that was both severely 
academic and daringly imaginative. Almost singlehandedly, they initiated 
the distinct academic field of oral traditional literature, which concerns itself 
with the study of compositional, performative, and aesthetic aspects of living 
oral traditions and of texts dependent on oral tradition. Strictly speaking, the 
work inaugurated by Parry and Lord, and energetically carried forward by 
John Miles Foley, aspires to a new poetics informed by our growing 
knowledge of oral tradition.  By now the field has grown into a scholarship 
that cuts across a wide spectrum of the humanities and social sciences, 
bridging national and religious boundaries and encompassing the  
multicultural  body  of  the  human  race.  
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 Broadly speaking, the impact of Parry and Lord extends beyond the 
subject matter of oral tradition.  The rediscovery of a culture of speech in the 
Western tradition has in turn encouraged reflection on the nature of texts, 
exposing a dominantly post-Gutenberg mentality within classical, biblical, 
and medieval studies.  To a growing number of scholars who are proficient 
in the field of oral traditional literature, it is evident that there is something 
different about many of our classical texts, and our conventional reading of 
them, than most branches of current literary criticism would let us know.  
Oral and orally dependent texts were tradition-bound, variously interfacing 
with orality and other texts, and deriving meaning from extra-textual 
signifieds no less than from internal signification.  “What we are wrestling 
with,” Foley has suggested, “is not just ‘mechanism’ versus ‘aesthetics,’ not 
just ‘oral’ versus ‘literary,’ but an inadequate theory of verbal art” (1991:5).  
Eric Havelock (1963, 1982) and Walter Ong (1967, 1982, 1983), whose 
work likewise came to focus on the culture of orality, pursued still broader 
avenues into philosophical, intellectual, and religious history.  Today, the 
field commonly referred to as orality-literacy studies challenges us to rethink 
a set of concepts we thought we had known for certain.  Text and 
intertextuality, author and tradition, reading and writing, memory and 
imagination, logic and cognition—these central metaphors of Western 
thought—are all affected by the study of oral traditions and a chirographic 
culture interacting with them.  We begin to see—as if through a glass 
darkly—the broader implications of Parry’s and Lord’s scholarship for 
understanding our cultural heritage.  
 This essay will not consider the technicalities and aesthetics of oral 
traditions per se.  I shall pay homage to Parry and Lord by developing across 
ancient and medieval culture some implications of the intellectual project 
they initiated.  The broad and rather sweeping scope of the essay does not 
aspire to another metahistory, for I share postmodernism’s anxiety about the 
futility (and vanity) of global narrative ambitions.  History resists 
assimilation to single research paradigms.  But in reinvesting imaginatively 
the interdisciplinary endowment of Parry and Lord, I seek to identify issues 
of longstanding and persistent urgency resonating across the religious and 
technological culture of our ancient and medieval past. 
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 “Speech is a powerful ruler.”1  With these words, the fifth-century 
Sophist, rhetor, and rhetorician Gorgias invoked what for him was the 
critical issue of language.  Ostensibly, the idea of language he had in mind 
was shaped by the media conditions of his culture.  The logos was perceived 
here neither as sign nor signification, and not as carrier of meaning or 
revealer of truth, but rather as a potent ruler intent on governing his subjects.  
Gorgias’ idea of the logos flowed directly from the experience of oral 
speech. Language was perceived to be a force, orally processed and 
operative in relation to hearers. This theme enunciated by Gorgias retained 
its hold on Western culture, bequeathing to it a myriad of linguistic, 
philosophical, and political problems.    
 True to the oral, rhetorical epistemology, Gorgias advocated an 
approach to language that comes close to the one we have recently 
rediscovered in terms of receptionist theory.  What interested him primarily 
about speech was not the processes of verbal composition, but the aesthetics 
of reception. “Of logoi some give pain, some pleasure, some cause fear, 
some create boldness in hearers, and some drug and bewitch the soul by a 
kind of evil persuasion.”2 The arousal of pain and pleasure, of fear and pity 
are the primary objective of the logoi.  Among words Gorgias singled out 
the metered language of the poetic tradition, which effected fearsome 
horrors, tearful sympathies, and melancholic desires (Helen:9).  He did not 
entirely dismiss the rational aspects of speech.  Occasionally he would 
attend to speech as technê, an acquirable art.  But his main interest lay in the 
elaboration of a psychology of the emotive powers of oral communication. 
The efficaciousness of words meshed with the form of the soul, impacting it, 
molding it, and converting it.  It was this affective persuasion of the soul that 
lies at the heart of Gorgias’ theory of language. 
 The alliance Western culture has forged with the powers of oral 
speech is an addictive but uneasy one.  Gorgias himself introduced the 
                                                           
1 Gorgias, Helen: 8: lovgo" dunavsth" mevga" ejstivn. 
 
2 Helen: 14: tw'n lovgwn oiJ me;n ejluvyan, oiJ de; e[teryan, oiJ dev ejfovbhsan, 
oiJ de; eij" qavrso" katevsthsan tou;" ajkouvonta", oiJ de; peiqoi' tini kakh/' th;n 
yuch;n ejfarmavkeusan kai; ejxegohvteusan. 
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celebrated metaphor of the pharmakon.  The power of words affects the soul 
as the drug does the body (Helen:14).  In speech, the processes of healing 
and poisoning were mysteriously mingled, swaying the psychic condition for 
better and for worse.  Under the powerful spell of speeches, the soul was 
likely to be cured or deceived.  The worst possible scenario, and one Gorgias 
was keenly aware of, was the use of words for flattery, manipulation, and the 
fulfillment of personal longings for power.  The principal characterization of 
this aspect of speech was deception (apatê).  It was a stigma that would cling 
to the powers of speech from antiquity to modernity.  Pressed for an 
explanation for this ambiguous operation of oral language, Gorgias invoked 
the realm of magic and religion.  The spell of words, especially poetic 
words, was perceived to be closely allied with magic and witchcraft (cf. de 
Romilly 1975).  Poetic performances, the stirrings of passion, and the 
conversion of the soul escaped rational probings.  Divine both in origin and 
in their inspirational effect, they created a godlike trance (enthousiasmos) 
among hearers.  Speech thus put into effect by accomplished oral 
practitioners was a form of divine madness. 
 It bears repeating that the principal problematic of language—as 
viewed by Gorgias—was not meaning, but power.  How did one cope with 
the poetic powers that drew their sustenance from divine resources?  Should 
speech be liberated from its seductiveness and channeled into the paideia of 
truth and wisdom?  How could the awesome powers of magical, 
inspirational speech be harnessed and integrated into a viable educational 
program?  How destructive a force was language untamed by method and 
technê?  Clearly, the issue was that language presented itself in terms of 
force and effect rather than with a view toward referential meaning, 
structure, or signification.   
 Once we recognize the importance attributed to language as power, 
and the duplicity of language in terms of healing and poisoning, Plato 
himself and his philosophical project begin to take on novel meaning.  It was 
Havelock’s signal humanistic achievement to have relocated the master 
philosopher into the broad cultural context of a technological and intellectual 
revolution in antiquity (1963, 1978, 1982).  Propelled by the invention of the 
“explosive technology” of the Greek alphabet (1982:6), a literate 
consciousness was ushered in that challenged the millennial tradition of 
poeticized, recitable language—the language of power and magic.  In that 
age of sweeping cultural changes, Plato’s dialogues both accelerated the 
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collapse of tradition-honored habits and endeavored to explore alternative 
ways of understanding.  The philosopher lived “in the midst of this 
revolution, announced it and became its prophet” (Havelock 1963:vii).  
Poised between the ancien régime of the poets and the literate technology of 
a new age, he articulated a moral and intellectual program that assimilated 
the reorganization of culture and consciousness.  
 When Plato refused to admit the poets into his well-ordered state 
(Rep. 605b, 607b), he pointed to the emotive and magical impact of their 
words.  He did not mind telling his audience that what it was applauding in 
the theater was the conduct of a woman, whereas men had learned to retain 
control over their passions (Rep. 605d, e).  His chief objection, however, did 
not rest on the problematic linking of poetic emotions with gender, but on 
the issue of mimêsis.  The mimetic art practiced by “friend Homer” (Rep. 
599d) and his fellow poets corrupted the soul and destroyed its rational part 
by fashioning phantoms removed from reality.  The poeticized tradition and 
experience of rhythmic and emotional spells so necessary to the act of 
identification was a kind of “psychic poison” (Havelock 1963:5).  Plato’s 
targets, Havelock came to realize, were the dramatic performances and the 
audio-visual group experience of audiences, and the degree to which this 
theatrical mentality indoctrinated a plurality of views about justice and the 
good held by the many.  Had Homer been able to truly educate the people, 
he would have “possessed not the art of imitation but real knowledge.”3   
 Plato himself lacked the temporal distance to appreciate the cultural, 
linguistic implications of his tirade against the Homeric poetic tradition.  It 
was Havelock’s illuminating work on Plato (1963) that explicated mimêsis 
in terms of a millennial experience of oral performing and traditioning.  
Shaping language in rhythmic, memorable fashion and composing it via the 
oral processes of imitation, the poets encouraged recitation and learning 
through repetition,  as well as emphatic participation.  But as far as Plato 
was concerned, knowledge acquired by imitation, repetition, and empathy 
was of little value.  What mattered was to determine “what each thing really 
is,”4 a new type of mental activity clearly envisioned as a conversion away 
from plural  impressions toward the abstracted object and timeless truth.   
                                                           
3 Rep. 600c: ouj mimei'sqai ajlla; gignwvskein dunavmeno". 
 
4 Rep. 533b. o} e[stin e{kaston. 
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For the philosophical purpose of Platonism was “to accelerate the 
intellectual awakening which ‘converts’ the psyche from the many to the 
one, and from ‘becomingness’ to ‘beingness’” (Havelock 1963:258-59). 
This new type of intellectual activity was related to the methods of mental 
storage that had undergone changes since the time of the Homeric bards.  
Alphabetic literacy not only distanced the individual from the tribal 
encyclopedia, it also freed the mind to entertain thoughts apart from and 
even against it.  Plato’s resentment against the poets could thus well be 
understood as a revolt of the literate mentality against the oral traditional 
hegemony of Homeric poetic culture.  
 Although Plato’s philosophy was a beneficiary of the rationalizing 
effects brought about by the alphabetization of the Greek language and of 
chirography, the philosopher could not bring himself to embrace the new 
medium as a matter of principle.  While availing himself of the new 
chirographic technology, he lamented its corrosive effects on memory, 
discourse, and culture generally, basing his objections on a thoroughly oral 
apperception of language.  Writing, far from assisting memory, implanted 
forgetfulness into our souls (Phaedr. 275a).  Written words were antisocial, 
because they segregated themselves from living discourse.  Like paintings, 
writings “maintain a solemn silence”: they stare at readers, telling them “just 
the same thing forever.”5  Chirographic products were rather like children 
who had lost their parents and were unable to defend themselves.  Plato 
knew that it was the inevitable fate of writings to fall into the hands of the 
wrong people (Phaedr. 275e).  Writing, finally, was an unacceptable 
exteriorization of thought that only gave the appearance of wisdom (Phaedr. 
275a).  These were all arguments characteristic of a mind deeply versed in 
oral culture, distrustful of the harmful influence of writing and committed to 
the living, dialogical, and interiorizing powers of speech.  
 Poetic speech aside, what would Plato have to say about non-
poeticized, oral speech that by his time came to be called rhetoric?  On this 
matter he joined Gorgias in denouncing speakers who “steal away our 
souls”6 with their embellished words and whose flattery sends us to the 
“Islands of the Blessed.”7  Rhetoric simply as a producer of persuasion was 
                                                           
5 Phaedr. 275d: semnw'" pavnu siga'/ . . . e{n ti shmaivnei movnon taujto;n ajeiv. 
 
6 Menex. 235a: gohteuvousin hJmw'n ta;" yucav" . 
 
7 Menex. 235c: makavrwn nhvsoi". 
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hostile to an environment that nourished discourse and dialogue.  Ask any of 
our proficient speakers about their words, he exclaimed in a state of 
exasperation, and they will give us more speeches of the same: “like books 
they cannot either answer or ask a question on their own account.”8  The “art 
of oratory”9 is no art at all if it is practiced by one who is “chasing after 
beliefs, instead of knowing the truth.”10  Rhetoric’s basic flaw was thus its 
inability to enlist words in the search for truth. 
 Resentful of the magical powers of speech, in revolt against the poetic 
mentors of ancient Greece, and distrustful as well toward the new 
technology of writing, Plato redefined the oral, rhetorical tradition in terms 
of dialectic.  One of its objectives was to keep words alive in the flow of 
discourse and to forestall ideational sedimentation.  Unfettered by scribal 
constraints and mimetic routine, dialectic availed itself of the oral mode of 
communication, which was flexible enough to facilitate replacement of 
anything with something else, should the need arise.  But it was a “discourse 
of reason,”11 distanced from Gorgias’ magical comprehension of speech, and 
unthinkable without the rationalizing effects of writing.  Dialectical 
reasoning isolated and defined subject matters, divided and subdivided them 
until “it reached the limit of division.”12  Proceeding in this analytic fashion, 
it aspired to lead the soul away from the particulars and toward the 
contemplation of “the very essence of each thing.”13  
 One of the most revolutionary aspects of the Platonic dialectic was its 
ambition to arrive at the nature of things “apart from all perceptions of 
sense.”14  The person most likely to succeed was one whose soul was “free 
                                                           
8 Protag. 329b: w{sper bibliva oujde;n e[cousin ou[te ajpokrivnasqai ou[te 
aujtoi; ejrevsqai. 
 
9 Phaedr. 262c: lovgon a[ra tevcnhn.  
 
10 Ibid.: dovxa" de; teqhreukwv". 
 
11 Rep. 532a: dia; tou' lovgou. 
 
12 Phaedr. 277b: mevcri tou' ajtmhvtou tevmnein ejpisthqh'/. 
 
13 Rep. 532a: ejp aujto; o} e[stin e{kaston. 
 
14 Ibid.: a[neu pasw'n tw'n aijsqhvsewn. 
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of all distractions such as hearing or sight or pain or pleasure of any kind”15 
and eager to pursue the truth “by applying his pure and unadulterated 
thought”16 to the object of thought.  The quest for knowledge was to be 
transacted “by thought itself,”17 as it were.  These were ideas no longer in 
keeping with the affective persuasion of words and the divine madness they 
created among hearers; they were diametrically opposed to the cultural 
mindset of Homeric orality.  Language was thereby transformed into a 
catalyst of cognition, displacing the oral powers both of emotive incitement 
and rhetorical persuasion.   
 Viewed in the context of a cultural revolution, Plato’s dialectic 
endeavored to forge a middle way.  It sought to retain the medium of speech, 
while effecting its domestication in the interest of logic.  As a  consequence, 
rhetoric’s “‘savage’ roots” were severed (Ricoeur 1977:10), and oratory was 
subjected to the discipline of philosophical reasoning.  Oral discourse 
written into the soul of the listener remained a viable procedure, but it was 
discourse tamed by the logical restraints of dialectical reasoning. In late 
antiquity and in the Middle Ages, the dialectic tradition came to be situated 
between rhetoric on one hand and logic on the other, whose conflictual 
relationship constituted a deep and enduring problematic in the Western 
tradition.  
 Plato’s daring project to purify thought by the exclusion of the senses 
flies in the face of ancient theories of knowledge.  For it was widely 
understood that orality and rhetoric, as well as the art of scribality, engaged 
the human sensorium and played the sensory register in the interest of 
retention, emotive incitement, and persuasion.  Ong’s phenomenology of 
culture and consciousness has furnished ample evidence of the oral affinity 
between sound and thought (1967:111-75).  What must be added is that the 
processes of knowledge were transacted by analogy with seeing no less than 
with hearing.  Both vision and voice were sense analogues for the intellect.  
That one should “disregard the eyes and other senses and go on to being 
                                                           
15 Phaed. 65c: touvtwn mhde;n paravluph/', mhvte akoh; mhvte o[yi" mhvte 
ajlghdw;n mhdev  ti" hJdonhv. 
 
16 Phaed. 66a: aujth/'  kaq’ auJth;n eijlikrinei' th/' dianoia/' crwvmeno". 
 
17 Rep. 532b: aujth'/ nohvsei. 
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itself in the company with truth,” as Plato would have it,18 remains a 
revolutionary but passing reference in ancient philosophical discourse.  For 
the exclusion of the human sensorium from the pursuits of knowledge was 
largely unthinkable in ancient and medieval intellectual culture.  
 Indeed, Plato cannot dishabituate himself from visual metaphors 
altogether.  His language is replete with image analogues: eikon, eidolon, 
phantasma, homoioma, mimema (Patterson 1985:30).  For example, he 
would postulate the presence of an internal painter who draws into our soul 
pictures of assertions we make (Phil. 39b).  More importantly, he defined the 
highest form of cognition as a vision (eidos) of the soul liberated from all 
earthly chains and ready to contemplate the real and the true (Rep. 518c-
519a).  To obtain this view of the good, the soul has to be converted and its 
vision redirected “from the world of becoming to the world of being.”19  
Whether the vision is internalized or outer-directed, there is a form of seeing 
no less than hearing that serves as an agent of cognition.  
 A locus classicus for sense perception was memory, the esteemed 
“treasure-house of eloquence.”20  Long before the art of memory was 
assigned a place of honor in rhetoric, its significance was already recognized 
in mythology.  According to myth, Mnemosyne, the goddess of memory, 
bore Zeus nine daughters, the Muses, who personified different modes of 
poetry, the arts, and sciences.  An imaginable female, a corporeal similitude 
herself, the goddess embodied memory.  Her daughters, who carried the 
attributes of wax tablet and pencil, the flute and lyre, the tragic and comic 
mask, the scroll and a celestial globe, represented a civilization that was 
constituted by writing and music, the tragic performance and comedy as 
well.  But whether they facilitated sound or vision, speech or writing, they 
always functioned as the daughters of Mnemosyne.  As mother of the 
Muses, she was the origin of all civilized labors and a wellspring of culture.  
Memory, not textuality, was the centralizing authority.  Only a civilization 
conscious of and dependent on oral modes of communication and thought 
could have produced this myth of Mnemosyne and the Muses.  
                                                           
18 Rep. 537d: ojmmavtwn kai; th'" a[llh" aijsqhvsew" . . . meqievmeno" ejp 
ajuto; to; o]n met ajlhqeiva" ijevnai. 
 
19 Rep. 521d: ajpo; tou' gignomevnou ejpi; to; o[n. 
 
20 Quintilian, Inst. Orat. 11.2.1, et al.: thesaurus eloquentiae. 
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 From Aristotle we have received one of the earliest, strikingly 
philosophical, testimonies to memory.  His treatise on Memory and  
Recollection introduced a key feature of memory, namely, the theory of 
images.  Responding to external stimulation, memory retained a sense 
content, a visual representation of the external object.  According to this 
principle, all our thoughts and perceptions were deposited in memory by 
way of images: “we cannot think without images.”21  What was actually 
present in memory were pictures (phantasmata) of the real things.  In 
principle, memory could not process understanding as a function of pure 
thought.  Even conceptual thought, Aristotle insisted, cannot exist without 
mental pictures.22   
 Apart from its mythological thematization, memory was inescapably 
drawn into the orbit of rhetoric.  For Cicero (De Oratore 2.ixxxvi, 351-60), 
for the anonymous author of ad Herennium (3.16.28 - 24.40), and for 
Quintilian (Inst. Orat.  11.2), oratory was a subject of supreme practical 
value, and memory the esteemed custodian of rhetoric.  In the writings of 
these authors the theory of memory’s imagines and loci is delineated in 
some detail.  The work of memory was conducted via images and places; 
these were “the stock definition to be forever repeated down the ages” 
(Yates 1966:6).  The challenge was to create a condition that was favorably 
disposed to the retention of whatever one wanted to remember.  First, one 
had to invent figures, marks, or portraits that adhered the longest in memory.  
Since all images required an abode, one secondly had to employ a large 
number of mental places, clearly defined, in orderly arrangement and 
separated at measured intervals.  Memory thus perceived was entirely a 
spatial entity, like a house divided into many rooms, and its principal 
operative mechanism was the storing of images in those localities.  Words 
no less than things were thought to be transmutable into images and 
localizable at places, although it was often recognized that the memoria 
verborum was more difficult to accomplish than the memoria rerum.  Thus, 
in the work of memory, the visual nature of mental representations was 
widely taken for granted.  “Of all the senses, sight is the keenest,”23 Cicero 
                                                           
21 449.b.30: kai; noei'n oujk e[stin a[neu fantavsmato". 
 
22 450.a.10: hJ de; mnhvmh kai; hJ tw'n nohtw'n oujk a[neu fantavsmatov" e[stin. 
 
23 De Orat. 357: acerrimum autem ex omnibus nostris sensibus esse sensum 
videndi. 
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exclaimed, extolling the cognitive superiority of vision, a theme that was 
going to be replayed by Aquinas, Leonardo, John Locke, and a myriad of 
modern thinkers.  But when we consider that words such as fantasy 
(phantasma), imagination (imago), and rhetoric itself, essential components 
of the rhetorical model of cognition, have largely become pejorative terms in 
our time, we also recognize the changes in consciousness that distance us 
from our ancient heritage. 
 The memory tradition defied all theories of pure thought and 
verbocentrism.  Plato’s penchant for disembodied thought and desensitized 
vision of the good notwithstanding, ancient and medieval theories and 
practices of language were strongly indebted to a kind of physiology of 
perception (Padel 1991).  It was widely assumed that both hearing and 
seeing mediated processes of recollection and perception.  In spite of a 
developing chirographic culture, words were still perceived to be 
functioning more in the biosphere of human interaction than in the tissue of 
intertextuality.  Knowledge took its rise from the sensorium. 
 Augustine, practicing rhetor and trained rhetorician himself, singled 
out Paul as a paragon of Christian oratory: “With what a river of eloquence 
[his words] flow,  even he who snores must notice.”24   Indeed,  Paul’s 
letters, the earliest Christian canonical literary products, operated in the 
mode of argumentation and with the intent of producing conviction in 
audiences (Bultmann 1910, Wuellner 1977, Betz 1979, Stowers 1981).  If 
Plato was the dialectician in search of a reasonable alternative to sophistic 
deception and the ancien régime of oral, poetic authority, and Aristotle the 
analytical rhetorician making the ars rhetorica safe for philosophy, Paul was 
the practicing Jewish-Christian rhetor ever mindful of his message’s 
reception in its hearers’ hearts.  Academic and popular wisdom, however, 
unaware of the ancient recognition of Paul’s rhetorical skills and identity, 
has frequently identified him as Christianity’s first self-conscious 
theologian.  In this role he is perceived as a thinker who developed for 
reflection generic topics such as christology or eschatology, and who 
conceptualized faith, Spirit, and works.  But to perceive him in this classic 
theological fashion is to deliver him to the time-honored rival of rhetoric, 
that is, to logic.  While the degree of Paul’s indebtedness to Jewish, 
Hellenistic, or Hellenistic-Jewish culture remains subject to debate, there is a 
                                                           
24 De Doc. Chr. IV,vii,12: quanto vero etiam eloquentiae concurrerint flumine, et 
qui stertit advertit. 
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growing realization that he did not seek the truth abstracted from the 
pragmatics of concrete human interaction.  Increasingly we learn to see him 
as a master in discerning the persuasive potential of current issues and 
concerns, and in constructing appropriate epistolary responses.  
 Pauline rhetoric betrays a distinctly dialogical flavor.  Its reasoning, 
which was adverse to descriptively dispassionate thought, evolved in 
argumentation with others.  Historical criticism has well explained the 
prevailing polemics in the apostolic letters as responses, not to Judaism per 
se, but to alternate gospel versions. Viewed from this perspective, the 
Pauline letters give us insights into an early situation of multiple traditions in 
conflict.  But there is a rhetorical rationale for Paul’s mode of argumentation 
as well.  Far from admitting of any reflection on the personality of the man, 
his adversarial style has grown directly out of the rhetorical culture of late 
antiquity.  Thought and convictions in this culture were born out of assertion 
against opposition and in discourse with other persons.  One of the best 
known examples of Paul’s dialogical reasoning was the diatribe.  It was a 
device whereby imaginary and anonymous interlocutors posed questions, 
raised objections, and made patently erroneous statements, which in turn 
provided Paul with an opportunity to respond, correct, and state his own 
view on the matters in question. 
 The diatribe, in other words, was a rhetoric of simulated dialogue that 
purported to intensify contact and to lessen the distance between Paul and 
his audiences.  Nowhere in the Pauline corpus are the interlocutory devices 
of the diatribe more thoroughly implemented than in Romans, the very letter 
that addressed a community Paul had no personal knowledge of at the time 
of his writing (Stowers 1981:79-184).  But it is also in Romans that the 
idealized nature of the diatribal discourse is clearly in evidence.  More than 
the other Pauline letters, this one lacks features of historical specificity.  The 
fictionality of simulated dialogue in Romans is hardly incidental.  It is 
designed to enhance communication in the very situation in which Paul 
lacked case-specific information.  
  A principal technique of apostolic persuasion was to adopt and revise 
key terms employed by his addressees.  One remembers Socrates’ advice 
given to Meno that in discourse we must employ terms “with which the 
questioner admits he is familiar.”25  Paul’s thought, as it mainfests itself in 
his letters, proceeded in a dialectic of adoption and revision, a process that 
                                                           
25 Meno:75d: di  ejkeivnwn w|n a]n prosomologh/' eijdevnai oJ ejrwtwvmeno". 
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kept his language inescapably focused ad hominem.  Each letter, therefore, 
involved readers in a different intellectual orbit and in a distinct semantic 
field.  As a whole, the Pauline corpus presents itself as a kaleidoscopic 
experience, confronting readers with multiple rhetorical situations.  This is a 
principal reason for the difficulties modern readers encounter in 
comprehending the apostle’s letters.  The casuistry of his rhetoric runs 
counter to theological and logical premises, prompting charges of 
inconsistency, even of intellectual inferiority.  But rhetoric, not logic, is the 
key to Paul.  In the words of Carruthers, rhetoric “does not normalize an 
occasion, it occasionalizes a norm” (1990:181).  If logic considers an 
audience at all, it thinks of a universal audience.  Paul the rhetor practices 
thinking in interaction with multiple audiences.   
 Dialectical features notwithstanding, Paul is more adequately viewed 
as belonging to the rhetorical rather than the dialectical tradition.  True to the 
ethos of rhetoric, he shaped his message to preconceived ends.  Knowing the 
rhetorical objective in advance, he cultivated the means of persuasion that 
were to attain the goal.  His repeated pronouncements on the Law, for 
example, did not move from an analysis of the human plight under the Law 
to the solution in Christ, but rather from the experience of redemption in 
Christ to a reconsideration of the role of the Law.  Without recognizing the 
full import of his discovery, E. P. Sanders had in fact defined the rhetorical 
nature of Pauline thought when in reference to the issue of the Law he 
coined the memorable phrase: “the solution precedes the problem” 
(1977:442).  Whereas a thoroughgoing dialectic is propelled by a rigorous 
sifting of ideas aimed at discovering truth, rhetoric “knows its conclusions in 
advance, and clings to them” (Ong 1983:2).  In Paul, dialectic is subsumed 
under rhetoric.  While his argumentation is intrinsically consistent and often 
in keeping with midrashic norms of interpretation, it evolved out of and 
adhered to human life situations, and it knew its cardinal premises and 
conclusion in advance.  The principal test of truth was loyalty to Christ, to 
the gospel, as well as to him, the apostolic messenger.  Partiality, not 
objectivity, was desirable.   
 Paul the rhetor favored a fundamentally oral disposition toward 
language.26   He deployed the term gospel predominantly in auditory 
contexts and exclusively in reference to the oral proclamation.  To be 
effective, the gospel needed to be proclaimed and heard.  The notion of 
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responding to his addressees by way of a written gospel narrative appears to 
have been entirely foreign to his mode of thinking.  Hearing, not sight, was 
accorded a place of pride in his economy of the sensorium.  It was the 
supersense that facilitated interiorization of sounded words and faith.  Heart 
was the anthropological metaphor of human interiority and intentionality 
(Jewett 1971:305-33).  It was also the central receptive organ both of the 
Spirit (Gal. 4:6; 2 Cor. 1:22) and the word of proclamation (Rom. 10:8).  
Preached words, Paul insisted, entered human hearts, engendered faith, and 
in turn generated confession.  His media advise that “faith comes from 
hearing” (Rom. 10:17) contributed toward Christianity’s historical 
commitment to the ancient oral-aural sense of words, a commitment that 
prevailed across the centuries in spite of progressively technologized 
transformations of language.  If to Homer we owe the legacy of the “winged 
words,”27 from Paul we have received the metaphor of the light-footed word 
that “runs” its course,28 across the mediterranean oikoumenê, carried as it 
were by the apostolic feet. 
 As is the case with all categorizations, rhetoric illuminates principal 
aspects of Pauline language and thought, while simultaneously masking 
features that lie outside the rhetorical ethos, or are in tension with it.  Also 
present in Paul’s letters is a potentially conflictual relation with rhetoric. 
When in 1 Corinthians the apostle castigated the “wisdom of the world” 
(1:20) as a strikingly oral, rhetorical phenomenon, referring to it as the 
“superiority of speech and wisdom” or the  “persuasiveness of wisdom,”29  
he sowed the seeds of a  persistent Christian ambivalence about the culture 
of rhetoric.  Unwittingly, he anticipated the later Christian distinction 
between a wisdom of this world (sapientia huius saeculi) versus the 
genuinely desirable spiritual wisdom (sapientia spiritualis).  What is 
particularly noteworthy is that Paul was not unfamiliar with the traditional 
philosophical anxiety about sophistic vanities and empty eloquence.  He 
would rather stand accused of being “unskilled in speech”30 than use the 
                                                           
27 Iliad 1.201, et al.: e[pea pteroventa. 
 
28 2 Thess. 3:1: oJ lovgo" tou' kurivou trevcei. 
 
29 2 Thess. 2:1: kaq  uJperochvn lovgou h] sofiva".  2:4: penqoi' ["]  sofiva"  
[lovgoi"]. 
     
30 2 Cor. 11:6: ijdiwvth" tw/' lovgw/'. 
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gospel’s proclamation to advance his personal gain.  Still, his own 
reservation toward the wisdom of words was based not on the philosophical 
urge to cleanse language of its magical roots in the dialectical search for 
truth, but rather on the revolutionary kerygma of the cross of Christ that 
inverted human values, turning wordly wisdom into foolishness and God’s 
foolishness into genuine wisdom (1 Cor. 1:18-25).   
   In the first five centuries of the common era the merits and demerits 
of rhetoric were subject to debate, and the compatibility of rhetoric with the 
Christian proclamation remained controversial.  As is well known, many of 
the Latin and Greek Fathers were trained in the art of rhetoric, and some 
were teachers of rhetoric themselves.  Tertullian, Cyprian, the three great 
Cappadocians, John Chrysostom, Jerome, and above all Augustine come to 
mind.  They assimilated rhetoric, but rarely by way of unreflective osmosis.  
Conscious of the linkage between medium and message, between ancient 
rhetorical culture and the doctrina Christiana (Christian teaching, not 
doctrine!), theologians pondered the question of whether rhetoric would 
compromise the gospel.  Origen, a preacher and textual scholar par 
excellence, had little sympathy for Greek rhetoric as taught in Alexandria 
and Antioch (Smith 1974:89-90).  For others such as Cyprian, a teacher of 
rhetoric at Carthage, conversion was tantamount to a renunciation of pagan 
letters altogether (Murphy 1974:49).  “What,” Tertullian asked 
provocatively, “has Athens to do with Jerusalem, or the Academy with the 
church?”31  
 A matter of great consequence was the elevation of biblical texts to 
canonical status, creating a mode of privileged authority unknown to Greco-
Roman culture.  Increasingly, Christian theologians trained as rhetors and 
rhetoricians had to come to terms with Scripture, be it as source of a new 
rhetoric or as counterpoint to the old rhetoric.  In tracing their Christian 
identity to the new authority of the Bible, they developed a homiletic mode 
of discourse, long established in Jewish hermeneutics.  Homily, this 
Christian type of preaching, legitimated the biblical text as principal 
inspiration and textual guide of the proclamation.  The Christian homily was 
thus a type of rhetoric that was “basically determined by the order of the 
material in the text, to which may be added material from other texts” 
(Kennedy 1980:136).  As a consequence, memory was often relieved of 
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problems of invention and arrangement, and a new homiletic rhetoric 
evolved that was based on and filtered through the medium of the newly 
privileged text of the Bible.  
 In spite of the canonization of Scripture that privileged textuality and 
textually based thematic preaching to a high degree, memory was far from 
being ejected from the Christian tradition.  Augustine himself offered a 
sustained meditation on the mystery of memory in the tenth and last book of 
his Confessions.  Entirely in keeping with the tradition of ancient rhetoric, he 
adopted the spatial metaphor of memory, including the deposition of 
imagines at strategically placed mnemonic loci.  He was enraptured with that 
vast court of memory, this “large and boundless chamber,” replete with 
“numberless secret and inexpressible windings,” “the plains and caves and 
caverns, innumerable and innumerably full of innumerable kinds of things.”  
“The things themselves are not present to my senses; what is present in my 
memory however are their images,” ready to be recalled to sight in the act of 
remembering.  “Great is the power of memory, excessively great, o my God, 
a large and boundless chamber; whoever sounded the bottom thereof?” he 
asked exuberantly.32  Notably, Augustine’s conversion to the Bible and his 
prodigious chirographic activity did not diminish his enthusiasm and need 
for the memory tradition of ancient rhetoric.  
 Augustine belonged to a culture in which quality of thought was 
intricately related to the powers of remembering: “His memory, trained on 
classical texts, was phenomenally active.  In one sermon, he could move 
through the whole Bible, from Paul to Genesis and back again, via the 
Psalms, piling half-verse on half-verse” (Brown 1969:254).  And yet, as he 
probed the deep space of memory, he struck out onto new ground.  We note 
that his encomium in praise of the wonders of memory facilitated 
remembrance of what he had done, where, and with what feelings.  As he 
lifted these imaged experiences into the full light of his interior vision, he 
came face to face with his own self.  In this way, memory assisted him in the 
exploration of selfhood, a consciousness made possible by interior 
                                                           
32 Conf. 10.8.15: penetrale amplum et infinitum; 10.8.13: qui secreti atque 
ineffabiles sinus eius; 10.17.26: campis et antris at cavernis innumerabilibus atque 
innumerabiliter plenis innumerabilium rerum; 10.15.23: res ipsae non adsunt sensibus 
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memoriae, magna nimis, deus meus, penetrale amplum et infinitum; quis ad fundum eius 
pervenit? 
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visualization.  It seemed only sensible to ask if memory, the facilitator of 
consciousness, also had the power to mediate knowledge of God.  Augustine 
had come to know God, and where else could God abide but in memory?  
Was God not intelligible as a memorable presence?  But as Augustine 
traversed the vast space of his memory, he had to admit to himself that he 
could find neither place nor image of God.  There was a sense in which his 
search for God arrived at the cognitive limits of the ancient art of memory.  
Knowing God, without finding him in his interior recesses, Augustine was 
compelled to reach beyond memory.  “I will pass even beyond this power of 
mine which is called memory; yea, I will pass beyond it, that I may approach 
unto Thee, o sweet light.  What sayest Thou to me?”33 
 He again took up the issue of memory in De Trinitate, a psychological 
study of the trinity unparalleled in patristics.  In book eleven he developed 
the threefold dynamics of the mind that resemble that of the supreme Trinity.  
Of the many trinitarian structures he uncovered in the mind, the most 
important one for our purpose was that of memory, vision, and will.  The 
perception of external impressions, internal visualization, and the 
concentration of the mind, while representing different properties and 
faculties, converged under the guidance of the will in trinitarian unity:  “And 
so that trinity is produced from memory, from internal vision, and from the 
will which unites both. And when these three things are combined into one, 
from that combination itself they are called thought.”34  As far as memory 
was concerned, Augustine metamorphosed the rhetorical base of mind and 
memory into the metaphysical realm of trinitarian psychology.  
 Given the high premium placed on verbal performance and modes of 
argumentation in Greco-Roman culture, Christianity, which was itself 
centrally concerned with proclamation, was compelled sooner or later to 
define its position in relation to classical rhetoric.  The task was all the more 
urgent because Cicero was rapidly advancing to the status of magister 
eloquentiae and his rhetoric becoming a cultural model for late antiquity and 
the Middle Ages.  In spite of the fact that Christian culture increasingly 
embraced the Bible and popularized the homiletic style of preaching, the 
                                                           
33 Conf. 10.17.26: transibo et hanc vim meam, quae memoria vocatur, transibo 
eam, ut pertendam ad te, dulce lumen.  Quid dicis mihi? 
 
34 De Trin. 11.3.36: atque ita fit illa trinitas ex memoria, et interna visione, et 
quae utrumque copulat voluntate.  Quae tria cum in unum coguntur, ab ipso coactu 
cogitatio dicitur. 
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enduring influence of rhetoric demanded that theologians came to terms with 
its legacy.  
 No Christian writer in the first five centuries of the common era has 
addressed this issue more thoughtfully than Augustine.  In De Doctrina 
Christiana, “one of the most original [books Augustine] ever wrote” (Brown 
1969:264), he sought to find a rapprochement between the classical 
institution of oratory and scriptural authority, or, perhaps more accurately, 
he devised a Christian hermeneutic on its own terms.  Few Christians could 
have been more qualified for the task.  From childhood on, rhetoric had been 
Augustine’s single most important cultural influence, and yet his intellectual 
development took place under the aegis of a literate, increasingly biblical 
tradition.  Indeed, his Confessions have been interpreted as the self-
conscious construction of a conversion from an oral, rhetorical to a primarily 
textual culture  (King 1991:150-272).  
 In book four of this influential treatise De Doctrina, Augustine 
assigned rhetoric a place in Christian teaching.  Eloquence, he stated, could 
not be rejected out of hand, even though it was intimately associated with 
paganism.  What is more, non-artistic discourse would cripple the Christian 
proclamation.  On a number of substantial points, Augustine holds up as a 
model of Christian oratory “a certain eloquent man,”35 who is none other 
than Cicero.  For example, Augustine cites with approval Cicero’s dictum 
(De Invent. 1.1.1) concerning the interrelationship of eloquence and 
wisdom.36  In the Christian proclamation,  just as in pagan speech,  
competent rhetoric is not without wisdom, and true wisdom is ineffective 
without rhetoric (4.5.7).  Consistent with Ciceronian principles (Orat. 
21.69), Augustine advocates three modes of proclamation, each of which 
entails its own particular style of speaking.37  True eloquence requires that 
teaching (docere) be done  “in a subdued manner” (parva submissa), 
pleasing (delectare) “in a temperate manner” (modica temperata), and 
persuading (flectere) “in a grand manner” (magna granditer).  And yet, 
Augustine did not simply plead for a Christianization of conventional 
Ciceronian rhetoric.  De Doctrina, it must be remembered, was a theoretical 
reflection on the interpretation and teaching of a Christianity that was about 
                                                           
35 De Doc. Chris. 4.12.27: quidam eloquens. 
 
36  De Doc. Chris. 4.5.7. 
 
37  De Doc.Chris. 4.12.27; 4.17.34. 
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to be self-consciously centered in the Bible.  What distinguished the 
Augustinian concept of rhetoric from classical rhetoric was the central role 
assigned to the Bible.  The authoritative status of the Bible was assumed, 
and so was a biblical rhetoric intrinsic to the central book: “The great virtue 
of De Doctrina Christiana is that it made it possible for Christians to 
appreciate and teach eloquence without associating it with paganism” 
(Kennedy 1980:159).  Admittedly, the rhetoric of the Bible may fall short of 
the oratorical and ornamental features of pagan rhetoric, but in refraining 
from a more polished language, the Bible communicated what it intended to 
say.  
 If absence of sophisticated pompousness was one of the hallmarks of 
scriptural rhetoric, the presence of obscurity and ambiguity of meaning was 
another. Augustine was at pains to show how many biblical passages were 
written in veiled language. The separability of expression from meaning was 
thereby canonized in Christian hermeneutics. As he saw it, the obscurities of 
biblical writings were themselves “part of a kind of eloquence”38 designed to 
exercise our mental faculties in search of hidden meanings, “for what is 
sought with difficulty is discovered with more pleasure.”39 Consequently, the 
expositor’s primary task was neither the demonstration of rhetorical 
flourishes, nor an appeal to the emotions, but a raising to consciousness of 
“that which lay hidden.”40 At this point, Augustine’s perception of language 
is a world removed from Gorgias’ exuberant endorsement of the magical 
power of words, and distanced as well from Plato’s dialectical discourse of 
reason. De Doctrina did not expound on the unmediated efficaciousness of 
spoken words any more than it made a case for dialectical discourse, driven 
but disciplined by logic. It had more in common with Paul’s apprehension at 
the wisdom of the world, although it did not share in his letters’ 
fundamentally oral disposition toward language. What was new about 
Augustine’s De Doctrina was the privileged status given to a central text.  Rhetoric 
was thereby transformed into a teaching of the biblical texts, which entailed a search 
for latent meanings. In the end, Augustine’s De Doctrina, not unlike his 
Confessiones, undertook a painfully elaborate and intellectually meandering 
                                                           
38 De Doc. Chris. 4.6.9: tali eloquentiae miscenda fuerat. 
 
39 De Doc Chris. 2.6.8: et cum aliqua difficultate quaesita multo gratius inveniri. 
 
40 De Doc. Chris.  4.11.9: sed ut appareat quod latebat. 
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transit from the classical, rhetorical culture of antiquity toward a text-based, 
Christian hermeneutics. 
 It would appear that Augustine, never fully persuasive on the matter 
of biblical rhetoric, adopted a hermeneutic informed by scribal sensitivities. 
Philosophically, what concerned him most was not the efficaciousness of 
biblical oratory, but its character of signification.  Not content with affirming 
the allegorical tensiveness in Scripture, he proceeded to elevate the deferring 
nature of language to a linguistic, theological signs theory. Postulating a 
distinction between sign (signum) and thing (res), he could at times attribute 
an astonishingly provisional value to words: “by means of words, therefore, 
we learn nothing but words.”41  The most that could be said about words was 
that “they serve merely to suggest that we look for realities.”42  All words, 
spoken and written, were perceived to be signs that signified the authentic 
res.  Hence, “no one should consider [signs] for what they are but rather for 
their value as signs which signify something else.”43 Words were mere 
prompters as it were, and “the realities that were signified were to be 
esteemed more highly than their signs.”44  In part at least, this theory of 
signification was born under the pressures of scribal sensibilities. 
Undoubtedly, signifying deferrals were a commonplace in allegorical, 
metaphorical, and parabolic speech.  Orality and rhetoric had long been 
familiar with metonymic expansiveness that resonated with the transtextual 
world, and with figurative language that resisted being taken at face value. 
However, “Augustine was the first Latin author to call words ‘signs’” 
(Swearingen 1991:196).  What merits additional attention is his elevation of 
these processes of linguistic signification into a sign theory.  It presumed a 
lifelong experience with the chirographic status of language as signs, e.g., 
the embodiment of spoken language in a system of visual symbols.  When 
measured against the ethos of rhetorical efficaciousness, signs were 
obstacles to the presenting powers of spoken words.  In Augustine’s case, 
oral presence was deferred in the interest of a higher goal of unity.  The 
                                                           
41 De Mag. 11.36.5: verbis igitur nisi verba non discimus. 
 
42 De Mag. 9.36.2: admonent tantum, ut quaeramus res. 
 
43 De Doc. Christ. 2.1.1: ne quis in eis attendat quod sunt, sed potius quod signa 
sunt, id est, quod significant. 
 
44 De Mag. 9.25.1-2: res, quae significantur, pluris quam signa esse pendendas. 
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readers of allegorical and otherwise ambiguous scriptural passages were 
inspired to turn over words in their minds, to move from one hint to another, 
and from discovery to discovery, each one opening up further depths, and 
ideally to arrive at the love of God and the vision of God.  
 In the Western tradition, Augustine’s fateful distinction between 
signifier and signified was a major contributor to a linguistically based 
bipolarity of metaphysical magnitude.  It was replayed in a myriad of ways, 
pitting exteriority against interiority, the letter against the Spirit, the sensible 
against the intelligible, the written text against the transcendental Logos, 
temporality against eternity, and so forth.  In the end, it may be said that 
Augustine’s assimilation of rhetoric to scribality created a kind of 
“metarhetoric” (Murphy 1974:287), or perhaps more precisely, a Christian 
hermeneutics of communication at the heart of which lay the metaphysical 
nature of language.  In this fashion, it made an indelible impact on medieval 
concepts of language, buttressing the whole medieval world of analogies and 
correspondences.  
 
 
II 
  
 A Christian codex dated prior to 1000 C.E. depicts Pope Gregory the 
Great (540-604 C.E.) as interpreter of Scripture.  The miniature carries the 
title: Pope Gregory I inspired by the Holy Spirit (Gumbrecht/Pfeiffer 1993: 
726-29).  His left hand rests on an open book that is placed on a lectern.  
Undoubtedly, this book represents the holy Bible. In his right hand Gregory 
holds another book that is closed.  Decorated with a golden cover, it appears 
to be a copy of the Bible.  A white dove, a symbolic representation of the 
Holy Spirit, sits on the right shoulder of the Pope.  The dove’s beak is wide 
open and placed near the ear of Gregory: the Holy Spirit inspires the Pope.  
Gregory’s gaze is directed neither toward the viewer nor toward the books.  
His is a posture of auditory concentration.  He is listening to the words of the 
dove whispered into his ear.  Behind Gregory, separated by a curtain, sits a 
scribe.  In his right hand he holds a stilus, a sharp slate-pencil, and in his left 
hand a writing tablet.  With the stilus he points toward the dove, source of 
inspiration, and with his writing tablet he gestures toward the Pope, 
possessor and mediator of Scripture.  Presumably, the scribe receives the 
Pope’s dictation that had been transmitted to him through the mediation of 
the Spirit.  
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Tenth-century manuscript illumination by the Master of the Registrum 
Gregorii, Trier 983/84.  Stadtbibliothek Trier, Ms. 171a.  (The author 
acknowledges his gratitude to the Stadtbibliothek Trier for granting 
permission to republish the illustration of Pope Gregory I.) 
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 The miniature may serve as a central metaphor for both the grand 
simplicity and the notable complexity of medieval linguistic and religious 
culture.  It locates the Pope, assuredly, at center stage: he is the pre-eminent 
authority and chief interpreter of the Holy Book.  Apparently, the meaning 
of the Bible is not self-evident.  As sacred text it partakes of secrecy.  For 
secrecy “is a way of figuring Scripture as a book of revelation which 
nevertheless . . . withholds a good portion of itself” (Bruns 1982:18). Indeed, 
secrecy is an indispensable category of sacred writings (17-43). Thus, 
although widely understood to be the unified and unifying Word of God, the 
Bible was experienced as a text written in veiled language.  Its authority was 
firmly established, but its written status raised a host of interpretive 
questions.  There is a sense, therefore, in which the miniature dramatizes the 
intricacies of a hermeneutical scenario surrounding the sacred text.  
 Encoded in the miniature were differences that called for 
hermeneutical mediation.  The Spirit, represented by the dove and source of 
auditory inspiration, was once removed from the Pope, twice removed from 
the Bibles, and thrice removed from the scribe behind the curtain.  
Moreover, the open book of revelation was placed side by side with the 
closed book of revelation, and both Bibles were separated by a curtain from 
the scribe who was about to commit the Pope’s dictation to writing.  Thus 
medieval Christian culture, centered on the Pope, the Bible, the Spirit, and 
the scribe, has set into motion a process of triple mediation.  Assisted by the 
agency of the Spirit, the Pope was enabled to read and to open the closed 
book of the Bible, and to mediate his reading to the scribe who in turn 
transposed the dictation into writing, thus producing another text.  The very 
text-centeredness of the Bible is obvious, and yet its chirographic status is 
innocent of the modern perception of intertextuality that imagines a  
devocalized environment in which texts relate impersonally to other texts. 
The miniature clearly conveys the impression that the connective tissue that 
mediated textual meaning, the Spirit’s whisperings and the Pope’s dictation, 
was oral in kind. 
 Partially influenced by the growing dominance of the Bible, and 
fostered by the scribal traditions of monasticism and scholasticism, an 
increasing output of manuscripts was generated that lay at the basis of 
medieval cultural and intellectual life.  Still, if one wishes to comprehend the 
Middle Ages from the perspective of communications changes, one must 
imagine trends of the type of la longue durée.  The period roughly from the 
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fall of Rome to the invention of printing saw a general shift from oral 
performance to chirographic control of writing space. Manuscripts 
increasingly became important tools of civilized life, and from the eleventh 
century onward an ever-growing scribal culture shaped the processes of 
learning. One must, however, guard against simplistic divides of orality 
versus textuality, against anachronistic notions of medieval textuality, and 
against facile premises concerning links between manuscript technology and 
the restructuring of consciousness.  It bears repeating that this picture of the 
textualization of the medieval world is correct only on the macro-level of 
history. 
 Medieval scribality was a craft that required mastery of a variety of 
tools and skills.  The production of manuscripts was hard labor, “a seasonal 
activity like football”  (Troll 1990:118),  but rarely of a gratifying 
intellectual nature.  In so far as scribes were copyists, they worked in the 
interest of preservation and transmission of knowledge; when they took 
dictation, they served as catalysts of orally dictated compositions.  But 
whether they copied or took dictation, scribes were craftsmen, not 
personalities eager to think for themselves or to advance knowledge.  
Whether medieval scribal craftsmen were engaged in monastic discipline or 
conscripted into the paid service of rulers and administrators, theirs was 
always hard manual labor, indeed drudgery, which did not advance their 
libido sciendi any more than it stimulated their urge for self-expression and 
individuation.  
 More importantly, the effects of manuscript technology were not 
directly translatable into literacy.  We do well to keep scribal textuality 
distinct from literacy.  Some of the most exquisite medieval scribal 
productions, the illuminated Bibles, were primarily sacred artifacts, objects 
of ritual celebration, rather than direct sources of intellection.  As a craft 
revolution, scribality enhanced the availability and status of texts.  But the 
literate revolution, that is, the formation of a broadly based and informed 
readership, did not get underway until the sixteenth century when print 
technology revolutionized communications processes. In medieval culture, 
not only did literacy remain  the privilege of few,  but reading and writing 
did not inevitably connect to form a literate mentality.  Reading was widely 
practiced as an oral activity (Balogh 1926, Saenger 1982,  Achtemeier 
1990).  To be sure, aids to visual apperception slowly increased.  
Punctuation and word and chapter divisions, initially introduced in support 
of oral reading, imposed a visual code upon manuscripts, a process that 
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gradually encouraged silent copying and silent reading.  Still, far into the 
high Middle Ages “reading was regarded as an active energetic exercise, 
requiring good health, and not as a passive sedentary pastime” (Saenger 
1982:382; cf. 377-82).  The recipients of texts were often listeners who did 
not necessarily know how to write, while scribal copyists were frequently 
unable to comprehend what they wrote.  “Reading” was linked with the 
dictation and recitation of texts more than with private reflection.  What 
constituted “literate” intellectualism was thus not necessarily the combined 
skills of reading and writing, but rather a high degree of audiovisual 
apperception and memorial practices (Carruthers 1990).  
 Undoubtedly, the high culture of medieval learning, which excelled in 
formulating intricate philosophical, religious, and linguistic theses with 
signal keenness of intellect, was the beneficiary of a developing chirographic 
activity.  Once ideas and experiences were enshrined in writing, they began 
to assume a semblance of stability, irrespective of their continued oral 
functioning.  Once knowledge was detached from the oral traditional 
biosphere, it was disposed toward depersonalization, and hence subject to 
reflection and analysis.  Relentless scribal labors extended the texual base 
that slowly but inevitably enhanced the possibilities of comparative and 
critical thought.  In this high intellectual culture, reflections on language, 
cognition, mind, and memory were increasingly shaped by a working 
relationship with texts.   
 There was an additional feature that uniquely assisted medieval 
coherence and consciousness: the use of the Latin language.  Medieval 
intellectualization owes as much, if not more, to the use of Latin as to scribal 
productivity.45  For at least a thousand years, roughly from the sixth to the 
sixteenth century, the Western Middle Ages was under the governing 
influence of Latin.  Litterati were primarily those canonists, diplomats, 
administrators, and theologians who had mastered Latin—which may or 
may not have included the ability to read and write.46  Latin became a 
standard of medieval high culture and the vehicle of theological, 
philosophical achievements.  Coleman’s observation that in certain monastic 
circles the assiduous study of grammar “was meant to teach a way to reach 
heaven through latinity” (1992:145) could well be extended to the 
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aspirations of many clerical litterati: Latin was perceived to be the linguistic 
medium that aided in the ascent to heaven.  But with the rise of ethnic, 
national identities, Latin either followed the concomitant upsurge in 
vernaculars and developed into the Romance tongues, or it turned into 
learned Latin, a “chirographically controlled glacier” (Ong 1967:78) that had 
little or no broad-based social marketability.  But it was precisely learned 
Latin’s abstraction from oral life that increased its value as an ideal 
instrument for the academic scholarship of a culture elite.  High medieval 
intellectual culture was thus the result not only of a rapidly increasing 
chirographic productivity, but of a distinctly Latin type of literacy that had 
removed itself from the oral lifeworld.  
 Even though manuscripts eventually came to function as articifial 
memory bases in their own right, medieval scribality and latinity neither 
displaced nor vacated memory.  Quite the opposite.  For centuries the 
growing body of texts only intensified and complicated demands made on 
memory: “Medieval culture remained profoundly memorial in nature, 
despite the increased use and availability of books . . .” (Carruthers 
1990:156).  Not only was there more and more material that had to be 
processed, more and more authoritative voices that had to be registered and 
reconciled, but changing cultural circumstances enlisted memory into new 
services.  As far as preoccupation with memory was concerned, medieval 
Christian intellectualism in no way lagged behind antiquity, although 
memory was often exiled from its natural home in rhetoric and assimilated 
to new religious and epistemological tasks (cf. Coleman 1992).  
 The French Cistercian reformer Bernard of Clairvaux, who 
represented medieval monasticism at its height, contributed to the 
conversion of memory from the theory of rhetoric’s esteemed treasure-house 
of eloquence to a symbol of religious reconstruction.  Steeped in the 
monastic experience of hard labor, prayer, and silence,  he saw little 
meaning in memory as a depository of precious icons and loci that 
negotiated cognition and consciousness.   His religious experience taught 
him that memory was a house that was “contaminated with intolerable 
filth.”47  Into it, “as if into some cesspit runs all abomination and 
uncleanness.”48  “Why should I not grieve for the stomach of my memory,” 
                                                           
47 De Con. 4.8: intolerabili fetore contaminat. 
 
48 De Con. 3.4: velut in sentinam aliquam, tota decurrit abominatio, et immunditia 
tota defluxit. 
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he exclaimed, “which is congested with such foulness?”49  He advised his 
audience to “close the windows, lock the doors, block up the openings 
carefully”50 through which so much filth has infiltrated and clogged up 
memory.  While Bernard was careful to state that memory itself should be 
left intact, he advised his hearers “to purify memory and pump out the 
cesspit.”51  However brief the enticements of sensual experiences, “the 
memory is left with a bitter impression, and dirty footprints remain.”52 
These, too, should not be erased altogether, but retrained and enlisted in the 
service of smelling, inhaling, tasting, seeing, and hearing the delights of 
charity, hope, and spiritual pleasures.  Memory thus reconstructed—purged 
and equipped with a converted sensory base—was able to facilitate the 
believers’ gradual attainment of spiritual purity.  Steeped in monastic 
discipline, Bernard turned memory, rhetoric’s treasure-house of knowledge 
and Augustine’s instrument of self-knowledge, into a vehicle of religious 
conversion. 
 Scholasticism, one of the supreme philosophical and theological 
achievements of the Middle Ages, registered in different ways the cultural 
revolution marked by scribal productivity and latinity.  A hallmark of 
scholasticism’s intellectual project was the compilation and juxtaposition of 
biblical, patristic, and philosophical authorities.  The need for collecting 
seemingly discordant authorities is a procedure utterly foreign to us.  The 
project was founded on the fundamental premise of the two distinct, but 
reconcilable, sources of truth, theology, and philosophy.  More is at stake 
here than the oral penchant for quoting authorities.  The drive toward the 
collection and juxtaposition of authorial voices was in part at least 
attributable to the textualization of medieval learned culture.  It was thrust 
upon scholastic theologians by the steady growth and growing diversity of 
Latin texts.  The translation of Aristotle from Greek and Arabic into Latin 
from the tenth through the twelfth centuries had a particular bearing on this 
development.  Here was an activity that made available systems of thought 
                                                           
49 De Con. 3.4: quidni doleam ventrem memoriae, ubi tanta congesta est putredo?  
 
50 De Con. 4.8: claude fenestras, obsera aditus, foramina obstrue diligenter.  
 
51 De Con. 15.28: purganda scilicet memoria et exhaurienda sentina. 
 
52 De Con. 3.4: memoria quaedam impressit signa memoriae, sed vestigia faeda 
reliquit. 
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(Aristotle, Avicenna, Averroes) that were not only independent of theology, 
but placed a high premium on reason and rational reflection (Coplestone 
1985:II, 205-11).  The compilation of discordances, the passion for weighing 
and comparing different opinions, the contraposition of authorities, and the 
desire to seek clarification amidst authorial dissonance were all features 
traceable to growing intellectual diversity based on a rapid enlargement of 
the textual database.  This is precisely what the scholastic theologian Peter 
Abailard conceded in the prologue to Sic et Non, a collection of seemingly 
contradictory authoritative statements on 150 theological issues.  What 
necessitated his labors, he wrote, was “the very vastness of verbal 
materials,” which “appeared to be not only in themselves different, but truly 
also contradictory.”53   
 While driven by the conditions of a textual revolution, the scholastic 
method of organizing thought remained indebted to a form of dialectic. 
Adopting a pattern of threefold schematization, issues were isolated and 
discussed by way of explication of objections, argumentation of resolution, 
and refutation of objections (Grabman 1909-11:I, 28-54).  Rather than 
proceeding along the lines of a sequential, discursive logic, the scholastic art 
of structuring thought still operated in the tradition of a disputatious 
dialectic.  But the scholastic dialectic differed from the Platonic dialectic, 
which had intended to keep thought alive in the flow of living discourse.  
The dialectic of St. Thomas’ Summa Theologiae, for example, was 
characterized by a nonemotional, stylized quality of thought and a severe 
asceticism of language.  His intellectualism moved in the rarified world of 
intensely abstract thought.  Both in its organization of thought and in the 
delivery of ideas, it presented itself as a paragon of supreme rationalization. 
In its passion for rational penetration,  the Summa practiced argumentation 
in a highly formalized dialectic.  It is generally acknowledged that the 
strategies of scholastic dialectic originated in the medieval system of 
academic learning (Grabman 1909-11:I, 31-32;  Coplestone 1985:II, 214-
15).   It was in university  settings that teachers trained students by 
prompting them to raise objections to propositions, by directing the 
processes of argumentation, and by formulating final resolutions.  This was 
the cultural context, in which medieval philosophers from the tenth to the 
fifteenth centuries shaped the tradition of academic dialectic into an 
                                                           
53 Sic et Non, I, 1-2: . . .tanta verborum multitudine. . . non solum ab invicem 
diversa verum etiam invicem adversa videantur.   
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instrument of high-powered precision, composing in a Latin that was neither 
that of the ancients nor that of the Fathers, but a Latin of a distinctly 
scholastic diction.  However, it is typical of the harmonizing disposition of 
Thomas’ Summa that the authorities were secured in tradition more than 
seriously challenged, that more often than not the objections raised were of a 
perfunctory rather than a substantive kind, and that the resolutions were 
anticipated in advance of the argumentation.  This is but another way of 
saying that Thomistic dialectic, this highly formalized academic ritual that 
was passionately devoted to logic, was at the same time constrained by 
rhetorical conventions (Kinneavy 1987:90-94).  Viewed from this 
perspective, the scholastic method of Thomistic dialectic, anchored in logic 
yet beholden to rhetorical premises, manifested the old and unresolved 
conflict between rhetoric and logic.   
 The question of what memory was and how it collaborated with the 
mind had to be assimilated to the new intellectual system of scholasticism. 
In substance, Thomas reiterated the ancient rhetorical theory of the 
mnemonic imagines and loci, adding the advice that one must cleave with 
affection to the things to be remembered in order “to keep the shape of 
images intact.”54  Thomas fully shared the Aristotelian premise that “all our 
cognition takes its rise from sense perception.”55  In his commentary on 
Aristotle’s De Memoria et Reminiscentia he returned again and again to the 
commonplace proposition that “man cannot understand without image.”56  In 
part at least, human knowing was conceived on the analogy of interior 
visualization; it originated in phantasmata or corporeal images that were 
situated in memory.  To be sure, parts of memory had the faculty of 
entertaining thoughts and opinions, but in principle no human thinking could 
take place without some kind of imaging.  Additionally, memory’s 
imaginary perception was always of particulars; it had no grasp of 
universals.  Owing to the scholastic axiom that “it is natural to man that he 
should come to the intelligible things,” e.g. the universals, “by way of the 
                                                           
54 Summa, vol. 36, quaestio. 49: conservat integras simulacrorum figuras. 
 
55 Summa  I, 1, quaestio 1: omnis nostra cognitio a sensu initium habet. 
 
56 Liber I, lectio 2: non possit homo sine  phantasmate  intelligere. 
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sensible things,” e.g. the particulars,57 memory and its menu of icons served 
as the indispensable base for all our cognitive processes.  In reflection on 
and abstraction from the particularity of sense images, intellectual cognition 
came to know what was truly worth knowing: the divine universals.  With 
Thomism, memory was thoroughly integrated into the medieval system of 
knowledge and faith.  But it is worth noting that in the new scheme of 
things, memory functioned no longer in its classic oral sense as a treasure-
house of eloquence, but metaphysically, as a mediator of universals and 
facilitator of the knowledge of God.  
 There was yet another, more obvious sense, in which Thomas strove 
to disengage memory from its traditional base in rhetoric.  Not content with 
assigning memory to the metaphysics of knowing, he also reassigned it to 
ethics.  Memory, originally the mother of the nine Muses, had become one 
of eight components of prudence, the governing queen of all moral virtues. 
Since prudence had made it her business to secure knowledge about the 
future based on past or present experiences,58 and memory sought to store 
knowledge about the past,59 prudence depended on memory.  Hence, 
prudence and memory were expected to cooperate in the interest of 
discerning matters in advance so as to facilitate the right course of action. 
Although thoroughly familiar with the ancient and medieval disciplines of 
memory, Thomas refrained from commending memory as rhetoric’s 
treasure-house of eloquence.  This fact will not have come about entirely 
without the pressures of scribality.  At a time when handwritten materials 
came increasingly into use, memory began to lose its ancient rhetorical 
rationale, and as it forfeited its base in rhetoric, Thomas recommended it as a 
helpmate of prudence based on considerations of practical reason.60   
 We shall conclude with a model of cognition that manifested both the 
height and incipient demise of scholasticism.  William of Ockham, whose 
thought is frequently viewed in connection with the nominalism of the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, remains “to this day the most 
                                                           
57 Summa  I, 1, quaestio. l: est autem naturale homini ut per sensibilia ad 
intelligibilia veniat. 
 
58 Summa, vol. 36, quaestio. 47. 
 
59 Quaestio. 48. 
 
60 Quaestio. 47: quod est finis practicae rationis. 
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controversial thinker of medieval intellectual history” (Klein 1960:1556).  
Best known for his anti-realist position in the controversy over the 
universals, the Franciscan friar rethought epistemology and helped clear the 
way for what came to be known as the via moderna.  He was “perhaps the 
greatest logician of the Middle Ages” (Ockham-Boehner 1990:xviii), whose 
logical brilliance, verbalized in stunningly abstract Latin, was nourished by 
close rapport with a flourishing scribality.  At the same time, Ockham’s 
philosophy exhibited a distinct reserve toward rhetoric, dialectic, and 
imagination.  
 It was a deeply held conviction of medieval realism that language, 
memory,  and sense perception collaborated in the higher interest of 
universal knowledge.  In fact, divine universals, eternally true realities, were 
the appropriate objective of the mind’s aspirations.  More than that, to 
universals was attributed the status of truly existent metaphysical realities. 
The crux of Ockham’s controversial work was that it problematized the 
reality corresponding to universals outside the mind: “a universal is not a 
substance existing outside the mind in individuals and really distinct from 
them.”61  He refused to admit that there was anything in the experienced 
world that corresponded to the universality of a concept.  Universality was a 
function of the actus intellegendi (8), a mental construct, or simply the 
manner in which the mind achieved sufficiently generalized abstractive 
cognition.  
 As a logician, Ockham was well aware that the requirements for 
demonstrating the being of God were exceedingly difficult to fulfil.  
Nonetheless, in an argument of tortured logic he undertook to prove the 
proposition that God existed,62 while conceding all the same that God’s 
existence “cannot be known from propositions by themselves, since in every 
argument  something doubtful or derived from faith will be assumed.”63   
The unity of God, on the other hand, was not subject to logical 
                                                           
61 Epis. Pro. 6: universale non sit aliqua substantia extra animam existens in 
individuis distincta realiter ab eis. 
 
62 Proof. Ex. 6: sciendum tamen, quod potest demonstrari Deum esse. 
 
63 Ibid.: nec potest probari ex per se notis, quia in omni ratione accipietur aliquod 
dubium vel creditum. 
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demonstration.64  It could only be assumed in faith.65  On the whole, 
however, Ockham was more adept at demonstrating what was not 
demonstrable about God than in confirming his verifiable attributes. 
 If Ockham’s preoccupation as a philosopher was to purge Christian 
epistemology of the metaphysics of essences, it was not because he was 
prompted by agnostic impulses.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  
His philosophical intention was to immunize divine freedom and 
omnipotence from what he regarded as human essentialist interventions. 
There was no inherent necessity for anything in this world to be just as it 
was.  So far as God was concerned, things might be different.  If, therefore, 
the world was contingent, as Ockham thought it was, it was contingent by 
divine choice, and hence knowable only by its contingency.  
 Given this worldly contingency, Ockham held to an epistemology that 
presumed an autonomy of mind, memory, and cognition.  Priority was 
assigned to intuitive cognition, and immediate apprehension of the 
particulars by intuitive cognition preceded all other modes of knowing.  In 
Ockham’s words, “a cognition which is simple, proper to a singular thing, 
and the first to be acquired, is an intuitive cognition.”66  Only in second-
order acts of thought, the so-called abstractive cognition (cognitio 
abstractiva), could things perceived lead to the formation of images and 
propositions.  But even these second-order mental acts relied only partially 
on images.  Concepts and images, moreover, neither represented 
metaphysical essences nor did they invite cognitive ascent toward divine 
universals.  They were merely mental substitutions for the particulars. 
 Ockham’s skepticism with regard to philosophical realism moved the 
particular, the experiential, and the contingent to the center of inquiry.  
Consequently, his model of language and thought focused with 
unprecedented force upon the status and quality of distinctiveness, including 
the particularity of texts.  Scripture, indeed all texts, was assumed to be 
operating according to something akin to an intrinsic linguistic economy, 
and the operations of the mind—everybody’s mind— were such that they 
could access the internal textual logic via the cognitio intuitiva.  Gorgias’ 
                                                           
64 Ibid.: unitas Dei non potest evidenter probari. 
 
65 Ibid.: sed hoc fide tantum tenemus. 
 
66 Epis. Pro. 3: cognitio simplex, propria singulari et prima tali primate est 
cognitio intuitiva. 
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oral theory of language, which had manifestly postulated persuasive powers 
over the soul, was a thing of the past.  One looks in vain, moreover, for a 
special commitment to rhetoric.  As Ockham came to view things, language 
was not primarily meant to arouse emotions.  Furthermore, the status of 
memory was once again modified.  Divorced from its rhetorical, 
metaphysical, and ethical obligations, memory became a part of abstractive 
cognition and subordinated to intuitive cognition.  No longer the treasure-
house of eloquence, or the metaphysical abode of trinitarian psychology, or a 
vehicle of conversion, memory came to play the role of an almost Proustian 
remembering of things past.  
 Most importantly, the Augustinian sign theory, which had canonized 
the metaphysical nature of language, was not replicated in Ockham’s 
thought.  It was not that he discarded the signs character of language, but he 
reintegrated it into his nonmetaphysical notion of cognition.  The word as 
sign, he wrote, “does not make us know something for the first time . . . , it 
only makes us know something actually which we already know 
habitually.”67  Nowhere does one encounter in Ockham the Augustinian 
correspondence between signum and res.  There was no discernible 
correspondence between the linguistic signs and the metaphysical realities. 
The signs character of language had become an intrinsically linguistic 
phenomenon transposed into intramental processes.  More than that, 
Ockham could in a spirit almost akin to postmodernism state that “a spoken 
and written term does not signify anything except by free convention.”68  In 
postmodern linguistic terms, the relation between the signifier and the 
signified was an arbitrary one.  
 A principal feature of Ockham’s model of mind and language was a 
mode of thought that ran counter to the universalizing thrust of Platonic, 
Augustinian, and scholastic philosophy.  Ockham approached epistemology 
and theology from the side of the particular—“a change of outlook almost as 
epoch-making as the Copernican revolution in astronomy” (Ockham-
Boehner 1990:xxvii). In the history of humanistic thought, it was a 
revolution less popularly known but no less significant than the Platonic 
revolt against the poetic encyclopedia of ancient Greece.  A certain 
                                                           
67 Log. Pro. 1: non faciat mentem venire in primam eius . . ., sed in actualem post 
habitualem eiusdem. 
 
68 Ibid.: terminus . . . prolatus vel scriptus nihil significat nisi secundum 
voluntariam institutionem. 
442 WERNER KELBER 
underpinning, although by no means the single cause, of both Plato’s 
universalist and Ockham’s particularist turn was provided by the technology 
of chirography, which in Ockham’s case was reinforced by a high-intensity 
Latin.  When Plato aspired to the essence of things abstracted from the 
Homeric poetic tradition, and liberated from oral, tribal pluralism, he was 
aided and abetted by the alphabetic revolution in ancient Greece.  In 
Ockham’s case, it was his reliance on the inner resources of a chirographic 
tradition, matured to a highly stylized Latin, that fostered the mental and 
psychological distancing from the metaphysical superstructure.  
Paradoxically, it took Latin’s withdrawal from life, and a penetrating 
reflection on the fundamental problems of logic, in order to come to the 
realization that the essence was in the things themselves.  
 That Ockham was in fact a privileged and eager beneficiary of scribal 
culture is well established.  From the eleventh century on, manuscripts had 
increasingly become the working material for the cultural elite: “His whole 
scholarly life until 1330 was spent in the greatest of European universities, 
his circle the most ‘bookish’ of the time” (Carruthers 1990:158).  The year 
1330 marked a watershed in his life.  In that year he moved, in compliance 
with a papal ruling, to a Franciscan convent [sic] in Munich where he lived, 
cut off from all major University libraries, until the end of his life in 1349. 
Whereas the Munich period saw the publication of distinctly political, 
ecclesiastical writings, virtually all of his philosophical and theological 
books were written prior to 1330.  How important a role written materials 
had played in the formulation of his epistemology is underscored by the 
bitter complaints he issued from Munich about the unavailability of books 
(Carruthers 1990:89).  
 Let us return to the miniature of Gregory the Great that had portrayed 
the authorities of the Pope, the Bible, the Spirit, and the scribe in a 
dramatization of medieval hermeneutics.  Ockham revised this drama by 
shifting the balance of authorities.  The most consequential implication of 
Ockham’s theology was a decentering of the Pope in the interest of a 
sharpening of focus upon the Bible, and the implementation of a cognitio 
intuitiva, an immediate cognitive apprehension of Scripture.  The text-
centeredness, recognizable to a degree already in the miniature of Gregory 
the Great, had thereby acquired a sense of authorial objectivity.  With a force 
unknown to previous thinkers, Ockham moved the textual authority of 
Scripture and its individual interpreters to center stage, anticipating events 
that would not come to historical fruition (and explosion) for another two 
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centuries.  For the focus upon scriptural authority and the attribution of 
interpretive powers to individual human cognition prepared the way for a 
potentially conflictual relation between the authorities of the Pope and the 
Bible.  
 
 
      III 
 
 In paying tribute to Milman Parry and Albert Lord, this lecture has 
suggested degrees of connectedness between oral and chirographic 
incarnations of the word and the structuring of human thought.  Our premise 
is furthest removed from the notion that language and different linguistic 
embodiments are comprehensible as neutral carriers of ideational freight.  In 
the spirit of Parry and Lord, we have postulated that modes of 
communication were themselves potential embodiments of cognition and 
shapers of consciousness.   
 Glancing over the long haul of ancient and medieval history, we have 
made a set of observations concerning shifting roles of language, memory, 
and sense perception.  Speech as divine madness was viewed as the product 
of a linguistic culture that was dominated by an orality largely untamed by 
the powers of chirography.  Rhetoric, taking advantage of the technology of 
writing, made speech conscious of itself and also subservient to civic life. 
Few experiences enhanced Western text-consciousness more deeply than the 
canonical centering of the Bible.  It helped reshape ancient rhetoric into 
Jewish and Christian modes of homiletics, and unleashed a seemingly 
unending flow of midrashic rewritings of the privileged biblical texts.  
 Memory, the wellspring of civilized life, was a continuing theme in 
ancient and medieval culture that was in fundamental ways a memorial more 
than a documentary culture, notwithstanding the increasing production and 
availability of books.  But the praxis of memory changed as different media 
circumstances exempted it from strictly rhetorical obligations and enlisted it 
into the service of ethical, metaphysical, and historical remembrance.  
 The fundamentally oral, rhetorical understanding of the cognitive 
value of the sensorium was widely shared by ancient and medieval thinkers. 
Plato’s striving after pure,  disembodied thought never found credence with 
a majority of thinkers.  Elsewhere in ancient and medieval thought, 
cognition was perceived to be sensory cognition.  But a growing manuscript 
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culture, and the possibilities it raised for detached thought, left its impact on 
the role of the sensorium as well.  Among the cultural elite, the developing 
processes of medieval scribality went hand in glove with the privileging of 
Latin that, shaped into a finely tuned instrument for rational discourse, 
increasingly forfeited its marketability in a world of ethnic and vernacular 
turmoil.  
 Scholasticism’s hierarchical thematization of the sensibilia versus the 
intelligibilia acknowledged both the foundational role of the former and the 
superiority of the latter.  What William of Ockham set into motion was a 
reversal of Thomistic scholasticism, for which universals alone had been the 
proper object of knowledge.  If what mattered were not the universals but 
the particulars, attention was refocused upon the philosophically 
conventional, the culturally distinctive, and the linguistically contextual. 
Thus in a time of growing literacy, individual believers found themselves 
confronted with the internal logic of the biblical texts.  The Bible as central 
grammatological authority was thereby reinforced in ways unheard of 
before.  But if it was admitted that the biblical texts operated under logical 
laws that could be intuited by the minds of individual interpreters, then the 
Pope’s authority as pre-eminent interpreter of the Bible had implicitly been 
called into question.  A whole set of far-reaching historical and theological 
implications came into play, relentlessly text-centered implications, that 
reached their culmination in the sixteenth century.  For in so far as the 
Reformation came to elevate the sensus literalis to the exclusion of all other 
senses, and to embrace the principle of sola scriptura vis-à-vis papal 
authority, and to adopt the notion of scriptura sui interpres (Scripture is its 
own interpreter), it fulfilled the legacy of the via moderna, a legacy 
principally set into motion by Ockham and his successors.   
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